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This study examines the volatility ofshort-term interest rates dur-
ing three sample periods each corresponding to the use ofdifferent
operating guides for monetary policy: the 1970s, October 1979
through September 1982, and October 1982 through December
1984. Interest rate volatility was highest in the 1979-1982 period
although the experience was nothomogeneous. Since October 1982,
short-run interest rate volatility has been the same as that experi-
enced in the 1970s. Based on these data and a standard money
demand/supply model, some comparisons are made ofthe various
monetary policy operating regimes.
I
During the past decade, the Federal Open
Market Committee has employed three differ-
ent operating procedures to implement its
stated policy of a gradual return to noninfla-
tionary growth rates for the monetary aggre-
gates Ml, M2, and M3. Prior to October 1979,
monetary policy was conducted by setting
short-run targets for the federal funds rate.
During the period from October 1979 until the
fall of 1982, the FOMC placed more emphasis
on controlling the supply of nonborrowed re-
serves to the banking system. Since the fall of
1982, the FOMC has implemented monetary
policy in terms of targets for borrowed re-
serves. The differences among these various
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procedures have been discussed extensively (in-
cluding Wallich, 1984, Axilrod, 1985, and Gil-
bert, 1985).
Each of these operating procedures has dif-
ferent implications for interest rate volatility. A
graphical analysis of these implications can be
found in Gilbert (1985). It is a widely, if not
universally, accepted proposition that the im-
plication of a change to a reserve-oriented op-
erating procedure-such as that implemented
by the FOMC in October 1979-is an increase
in the short-term variability of interest rates,
particularly very short-term interest rates. The
rationale for this proposition is that under the
federal funds rate operating procedure in effect
during the 1970s, the various stochastic shocks
to financial markets originating in the private
sector of the economy were not allowed to af-
fect interest rates in the short-run because they
were offset through appropriate open market
operations. With a reserve aggregate operating
procedure, however, the reserve aggregate is
maintained at a constant value in the face ofsuch shocks, and prices (interest rates) function
as the market equilibrating mechanism in the
short-run.
One of the traditional concerns raised in op-
p,osition to a reserve aggregate operating pro-
cedure is that the interest rate variability under
such a regime would be so large that it would
interfere with the efficient functioning offinan-
cial markets. Consequently, one ofthe pressing
questions in any evaluation of the 1979-82
monetary experiment is the extent to which the
nonborrowed reserves operating procedures
imposed additional volatility upon market in-
terest rates. An extensive study of interest rate
behavior in the 1970s compared to interest rate
behavior during 1979-80 is available in the
work of Dana Johnson, et at. (1981).
One purpose of this paper is to reexamine
Johnson's investigation in light of what we
know from the structure ofvarious money mar-
ket models such as those constructed by the
staffs of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve and the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, and to extend the examination of in-
terest rate volatility into the period since the
fall of 1980.
The latter is important since there are at least
two reasons to believe that the experience in
1979-80 may not represent interest rate varia-
bility under an established reserve control pro-
cedure. First, the 1979 switch to the nonbor-
rowed reserves procedure was one without
precedent in the history of the Federal Reserve
System, and it may have prompted a consider-
able period of learning for market participants.
Second, in March 1980, a significant external
shock was imposed upon financial markets with
the implementation of credit controls. The re-
sults presented below suggest that the increase
in interest rate volatility experienced during
1979-80 was not sustained uniformly through-
out the nonborrowed reserves operating exper-
iment (1979-82) and that alternative, and more
appropriate, measures of interest rate volatility
show considerably smaller increases during the
1979-82 period relative to the previous expe-
rience than do the measures used by Johnson,
et at.
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A second purpose of this study is to compare
the results of the federal funds rate operating
procedure with the borrowings procedure em-
ployed since late 1982. Wallich indicates that
the latter was introduced to avoid uncertainties
associated with targeting nonborrowed reserves
in a period of rapid financial innovation, and,
at the same time, to allow interest rates more
responsiveness (such as the federal funds rate
to market forces) than existed under the pre-
1979 procedures.
We show that the standard money demand-
money supply framework used for analyzing
monetary control problems indicates that in-
creased volatility of interest rates does not im-
ply a reduction in the short-term variability of
money around a target value when switching
from a federal funds rate control procedure to
a borrowings control procedure. Furthermore,
the interest rate volatility observed under
either of these operating procedures is a mea-
sure of the lack of precision in short-run mon-
etary control, given a stable money demand
function and constant precision in forecasting
the income variables in the money demand
function.
Finally, we compare the volatility of interest
rates and borrowings in the 1969-79 period
with the respective measures for the sample
from the fall of1982 through January 1984. The
data suggest that there has been little, if any,
change in the volatility of either the federal
funds rate or borrowings from the Federal Re-
serve under the two regimes. This suggests that
the borrowing procedure in effect since the fall
of 1982 shares the monetary control problems
that were encountered during the 1970s with
the federal funds rate control procedure.
In Section I, the question of an appropriate
measure of interest rate volatility is discussed.
In Section II, comparisons of interest rate vol-
atility are presented in samples drawn from dif-
ferent operating procedures. In Section III, the
behavior of interest rates and monetary aggre-
gates under federal funds rate and borrowings
targeting procedures are compared, and the
similarity of behavior across the two regimes is
documented. Conclusions are stated in Section
IV.I. Appropriate Measures of Interest Rate Volatility
Johnson, et al. focus on the standard devia-
tion of levels and changes in various interest
rates, including the federal funds rate and
on various maturities of secur-
ities averaged over one-week periods. They
observe increases in volatility (standard devia-
of weekly average first differences of the
federal funds rates of more than 250 pel'cellt
cornp::lnrlg thc October 1979 through Septem-
ber 1980 period with the period ofJanuary 1968
thr,oug;h September 1979.
They also attempt to remove the effect of
large cyclical swings in the funds rate (presum-
low frequency) movements by focusing on
deviations from centered moving averages of
various lengths. Using these measures, they
find increases in federal funds rate volatility of
280 to 460 percent under the reserve aggregate
operating procedures.
There is reason to believe that these mea-
sures overstate the increase in volatility that
should be attributed to the change in operating
procedures. There was a considerable change
in the level of the funds rate from the earlier
period to the 1979-80period. During the 1969-
79 period, the funds rate averaged 7.05 percent,
while during 1979-80 it averaged 12.78 per-
cent. Thus, any first difference in interest rates
in the later period corresponds to a smaller per-
centage change. This means that the difference
in the levels of interest rates between the two
samples is a significant factor in biasing the
comparison of the behavior of interest rates un-
der the two operating procedures.
Consider the following model of the demand
and supply for money:
where
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Now consider percentage changes of the fed-
eral funds rate over very short periods of time
during which the income variable can be as-
sumed unchanged, the discount rate is
constant, and the nonborrowed reserves
is not changed. Under these circumstances:
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This model is borrowed from Pierce and Thom-
son (1972), but respecified in log-linear terms.
The respecification is broadly consistent with
the observed structure of econometric money
market models (Tinsley, et at., 1982; Judd and
Scadding, 1981; Anderson and 1"\.<1:,,_11''',
that are very close to log-linear over a broad
range of shocks. Questions of speed of
ment to equilibrium are not for the
question being addressed here, so the model in
equations 1-3 has been specified in '""1'","'Ul
form for simplicity.
Consider the reduced form for
federal funds rate derived from this model un-
der a nonborrowed reserves proce-
dure (RU exogenous):
Iml = <Po + <Pl lnYI + <h Imp
- <P3 InRU, + 'Ill
+ fLl 'Yo + "IJ
Inmi 00 + 01 InRUb + 02 Iml
+ 03 Imp + fL2
Inmi Inmp = Inm,
where
mp = demand for money balances
Y, = income measure
d = fed funds rate
(2)
(3)
Thus, the implication of such a model is that
over very short intervals, the percentage
in the federal funds rate under a reserve aggre-
gate control procedure should have a constant
variance (that is, be homoskedastic). This con-
clusion suggests that if volatility of the first dif-
ference of the federal funds rate with a reserve
aggregate control procedure when the level of
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its volatility under the same operating proce-
dure when the level of the funds rate is rela-
tively high, then the latter regime would exhibit
greater volatility by this measure than the for-
mer even though the variances of the structural
disturbances are the same in the two situations.
Since the available econometric evidence sug-
gests that log-linearity is a betterapproximation
to the structure of U.S. financial markets than
linearity, the comparisons presented in John-
son, et al. may have inadvertently been biased.
The argument presented above concerns the
appropriate interpretation of observed interest
rate behavior in a macroeconomic context. But
the fundamental concern with interest rate vol-
atility is motivated by microeconomic ques-
tions, namely that interest rate changes cause
capital gains or losses for bond holders. There
are reasons to believe that arithmetic changes
in interest rates do not provide a good measure
of capital gains or losses accruing to bondhold-
ers, and that percentage changes in interest
rates may be a preferable measure of the mag-
nitude of the wealth effects that will occur as a
result of monetary policy actions.
Consider the impact of equal arithmetic
changes in interest rates from a low initial level
of rates compared with a high initial level of
rates. It is well known that bond prices move
inversely with yields to maturity (the first par-
tial derivative of prices with respect to yields is
negative) and that the size of the price change
increases for a given change in yield as the ma-
turity ofthe bond increases.
It is also true that for a given maturity, the
size of the price change for a given arithmetic
change in yield varies with the base from which
the yield changes. In particular, the higher the
initial level of the yield to maturity, the smaller
will be the absolute value of the bond price
change for a given arithmetic change in the
yield (Malkiel, 1966, Theorem 4, p. 55).2
Hence if the major cause for concern about
interest rate changes is the dollar value of the
capital gain or loss accruing to bondholders, the
arithmetic change does not give a good measure
of the relative size of the problem when the
level of yields is different.
In contrast, percentage changes in interest
rates may give a good measure of relative cap-
ital gains or losses to bondholders, particularly
if we are concerned with such gains or losses in
percentage terms. The general formula is com-
plicated, and it is easier to see the rationale for
this conclusion by focusing on securities at op-
posite ends of the maturity spectrum, as shown
in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Measuring Gains and Losses to Bondholders
Percentage Change in Interest Rates
One period discount bond
P = (l r)F
One period coupon bond













i = yield to maturity
C coupon rate
F = face value
r = discount rate
iJ21nP -1
iJlni 2 = (1-+ ij2
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oAt the very longest maturity, the elasticity of
bond prices with respect to yield to maturity is
constant. At the short end ofthe maturityspec-
trum-one period bonds or discount securities
(bills), the elasticity of security prices with re-
spect to the yield to maturity varies consider-
ably relative to its own magnitude, but the elas-
ticity is so small that the implied capital gains
or losses are not very large.. For example, for
three-month bills with discounts at annual rates
inthe range offour to ten percent, the elasticity
of bill prices with respect to the discount is in
the range of .01 to .025.
II. Volatility of Rates Under Different Operating Procedures
The basic tests in Tables 4-9 of the Johnson,
et al. study have been reconstructed in Table 2;
but using logs of the various interest rates in-
stead of levels.3 The only significant difference
in the data is that the sample from January 1968
through September 1979 used by Johnson, et
al. has been truncated to January 1969 through
September 1979 because the 1968 data were not
readily available. The omission of 1968 is also
preferable since the original change from con-
temporaneous to lagged reserve accounting oc-
curred during that year. We recalculated all of
the standard deviations reported inthe original
study and were able to replicate the reported
numbers to within one or two basis points.
These comparisons are available in Appendix
B.
The results in Table 2 are quite remarkable.4
The comparison ofthe 1969-79 period with the
sample for October 1979 through September
1980 differs considerably when measured in
percentage changes. The standard deviation of
the week-to-week percentage changes in the
latter sample is from 1.8 to 2.2 times as large
as the corresponding standard deviation in the
former sample, depending on the rate being
compared. The larger increases in the standard
deviations tend to be at the longer end of the
maturity spectrum. The corresponding ratios of
standard deviations measured in terms of arith-
metic changes is 2.6 to 3.5. Thus, the choice of
units of measurement for interest rate volatility
is a substantial factor in assessing how much of
an increase actually occurred in 1969-79. How-
ever, the use of percentage changes does not
alter the conclusion that interest rate volatility
increased during the 1979-80 period over what
had been previously experienced.
The interesting experiment is to extend the
analysis beyond the fall of 1980. Four separate
TABLE 2


























































Oct. 79- Oct. 82- Feb. 84- Oct. 82-
Sept. 82 Jan. 84 Dec. 84 Dec. 84
.059 .046 .038 .042
.054 .022 .019 '{l21
.046 .025 .017 .022
.040 .023 .016 .021
.034 .021 .015 .019
.032 .019 .015 .017
.026 .018 .014 .016
.024 .017 .013 .015samples are identified for this purpose: Octo-
ber 1980 through September 1981, October
1981 through September 1982, October 1982
through January 1984, and February 1984
through December 1984. The first two of these
samples are drawn from the era·. of•nonbor-
rowed reserve control procedure and allow ob-
servation of changes in interest rate behavior
as the period progressed and markets gained
experience with the new regime (they also
avoid the contamination ofthe experiment with
credit controls). The third sample covers the
period from the abandonment of nonborrowed
reserves control in favor of borrowed reserves
targets (Wallich 1984, Axilrod 1985, Gilbert
1985) to the end of lagged reserve require-
ments; and the fourth sample covers the period
ofcontemporaneous reserve requirements with
borrowed reserves targets.
The volatility of interest rates remains
higher, relative to the experience of 1969-79,
throughout the three years ofthe nonborrowed
reserve operating procedure experiment. How-
ever, interest rate volatility over this three-year
period is not constant. There is a reduction in
volatility of interest rates uniformly across the
maturity spectrum from the 1979-80 period to
the 1980-81 period measured as the standard
deviation of week-to-week percentage changes.
During the latter period, the volatility measure
was from 1.2 to 1.9 times the corresponding
measure in the 1969-79 base period.
Across the maturity spectrum, the volatility
dropped by 15 to 33 percent of the observation
f6}"1979---80... The observed volatility in the
1980-81 sample appears to be repeated in the
1981-82 sample. In some cases, the computed
volatility in the 1981-82 sample is slightly
higher than in the 1980-81 sample; in other
cases, exactly the reverse is observed. The
changes appear to be quite random across the
maturity spectrum, suggesting a constant vari-
ance (homoskedasticity) during the two-year
period.
The .introduction of borrowed reserves tar-
gets appears to have altered rate volatility once
again. The standard deviations of the week-to-
week percentage change in rates decline uni-
formly after September 1982. In the case of
short- and intermediate-term rates, the volatil-
ity measure returns to the pre-1979 level, al-
though the 10- and 20-year maturities continue
to exhibit volatility on the order of 1.5 times
the pre-1979 observations in the 1982-84 pe-
riod. After the return to contemporaneous re-
serve accounting in February 1984, interest rate
volatility across the maturity spectrum is no
greater than that observed prior to 1979, and,
in the case of three- and six-month Treasury
Interest Rates
TABLE 3





































































1.39biHs,volatility seems to have declined sharply
inthe·most recent period.
These observations suggest several hy-
potheses. First, it appears that in the 1980-82
period, interest rates were less· volatile than
during 1979"-80,but, second,il.lterestrates ex-
hibited more volatility in that period than un-
der the federaLfunds rate control regime. A
third hypothesisis that, in terms ofinterest rate
volatility, the borrowings control procedure
pursued since the fall of 1982 is no different
than the pre-1979 control regime. These. hy-
potheses will be tested below.
One very simple procedure to test these hy-
potheses is to test the idea that the variance of
the various percentage changes ininterestrates
is constant among different sample periods.
The 1969-79 sample is used as an initial base
for such comparisons. The relevant F statistics
are presented in Table 3. The results presented
there indicate that, for the three samples drawn
during the nonborrowed reserves control pe-
riod, interest rate volatility increased signifi-
cantly across the maturity spectrum. For the
two samples subsequent to the "deemphasis" of
M1, the statistics in Table 3 generally support
the conclusion that interest ratevolatility is not
significantly greater than it was during the
1970s. The exceptions to this general statement
are the very longest maturities in the sample
periodfrom 1982 toJanuary 1984.
These results.are consist(:mt with.the second
and third hypotheses above. Since the standard
deviations in the 1982-January 1984 sample are
largerthan those inthe 1969--79 sal11plefoI"all
rates except the three-month, six-month and
52-week bill rates.(although not generally sig-
nificantly so), it isinteresting to base thetests
for equality ofvarianceontheinterest rate vol-
atilityobserved afterthe nonborrowed reserves
controlexperiment.This proceduredetermines
whether there was a significant reduction in in-
terest rate volatility after thC'!fall of1982. The
F-statistics for these tests are presented in Table
4.
The results for the federal funds rate here are
somewhat surprising. The test statistics suggest
that the volatility of the federal funds rate in
the 1980-82 period was not significantly
greaterthan that observed from the fall of 1982
through January 1984. In spite of thisconclu-
sion, the evidence suggests that volatility at all
other points on the maturity spectrum declined
significantly after the end of the nonborrowed
reserves control experiment.
Finally, a test of the first hypothesis that in-
terest rate volatility in 1980-82 is significantly











*Significant at 5% Level
TABLE 4
F-Statistics for Equality of Variance Compared
to 1982-January 1984 Sample
Sample Periods
Feb-Dec
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1984
2.48* 1.38 1.14 .69
7.42* 3.65* 3.61' .73
4.58* 2.81* 2.78* .47
4.22* 2.08* 2.49* .50
4.28* 1.88* 1.92* .55
3.88* 2.90' 1.83' .60
2.70' 1.82* 1.93* .64
2.42* 1.86* 2.01* .62
51 51 51 47
---~--~_.,-"'---,--- "---_._----"-~
52ported in TableS, The results ofthis test sup-
port the hypothesis that a significantreduction
in the volatility ofshort-term and intermediate-
term rates occurred between 1979--80 and
1980-82,
Several.col1dtisioris··appear'to be warranted
from this analysis, First, the period of reserve
aggregate operating guides was accompanied
by an increase in volatility that wasnotas large
as has been previously measured because ofdif-
ferences in the level of interest rates before and
after October 1979, and because the twelve
months subsequent to 1979 appear to beinflu-
enced by special factors,
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to use the
volatility observed in 1980-82 as a measure of
the increased interest rate volatility that would
be observed under a pure reserve aggregate
control regime, On the one hand, these obser-
vations are probably biased downward since the
1979-81 operation procedure was not a regime
in which fixed reserve paths were maintained
but one in which gradual adjustment was made
back to such paths when deviations occurred,
On the other hand, the interest rate volatility
observ~dduring this period may be biased up-
ward.compared to what could be achieved un-
der a fixed reserve path operating guide be-
cause lagged reserve accounting•was in•effect
throughout theperiod,
A third conclusion is that it is probably in-
appropriate to regard changes in the volatility
ofvery short~term rates as necessarily affecting
the volatility of longer term rates, Certainly
volatility increased uniformly across the matu-
rity spectrum in 1979, However, when the vol-
atility of the funds rate dropped dramatically
starting in late 1980, longer term rate volatility
did not immediately follow, Furthermore, in
the period since February 1984, it appears that
the volatility of Treasury bill rates of various
maturities has been reduced significantly below
the volatility of the same rates prior to October
1979, even though the volatility of the federal
funds rate in the two sample periods is
unchanged,
TABLE 5
F-Statistics for Equality of Variance

























53III. Are the New Operating/Procedures Different
From Those of·the.1970s?
The iQformationpresented in Tables2 .....5sug-
gests •that there is considerable similarity be,
tweelithev()latility ofinterest rates across the
maturity spectrum during the 1970s and in.the
period since the fall of 1982. Federal Reserve
officials are on record as indicating that the
pre;sentprocedures are not a return to the tech-
niques of the•1970s:
Since the fall of1982, the nonborrowed-
reserves strategy and its automaticity have
given way to a technique that allows the
funds rate to be determined by the mar-
ket, through the targetting of discount
window borrowing from one reserve
maintenance period to the next, imple-
mented by allowing a flexible nonbor-
rowed-reserves path....The relation of
the borrowing level to the funds rate,
which has been one of the most familiar
features of the money market, always has
been relatively loose. Since a chosen level
of borrowings is consistent with any of a
range of values of the funds rate, current
operating procedures cannot be regarded
as a form of rate-pegging (Wallich, 1984,
p.26).
In spite of assertions such as this, short-run
interest rate pegging and borrowings targeting
areifuJ:1damentally similar.monetarycQntrOI
procel;!ures. This can be seen from Figures 1
and 2.which illustrate a federal funds ratetarget
procedure (the practice ofthe 1970s) and a bor-
r()wel;! reserves target procedure (the practice
silice· faU. 1982), respectively,5 The •curve.la-
belel;! ..MD in the left hand side ofthe figure
represents a short-runmoney demand function,
while the curve labeled BD in the right hand
side of the figure represents the demand for
borrowed reserves by depository institutions.
Both are drawn as functions of the federal
funds rate (r), and it is assumed that the de-
mand for borrowed reserves is zero when the
federal funds rate is less than the discount·rate
(rD) , .These are simplifying assumptions for
purposes of illustration.
The exact positions of both the money de-
mand curve and the demand for borrowed re-
serves curve are not known with certainty by
the monetary authorities, nor are they con-
stant. Rather, both fluctuate randomly over
time.6 It is assumed that those fluctuations oc-














Borrowed Reservescurves M? and M~andby B?andB~. These
ranges of fluctuation are assumed the same for
both operating procedures.
With a federal funds rate operating proce-
dure, the monetary authorities, in principle,
keep the federal funds rate within a sIl1aUin-
terval around the rate (F) that they believe is
consistent with their monetary objective (M*).
This range is represented by r1 and rz. 7 With
the federal funds rate constrained to the range
rerz, the money stock will be observed to fluc-
tuate in the range M1 to Mz in the short-run,
and borrowed reserves will be observed fluc-
tuating in the range B1to Bz, with the specific
outcomes dependent upon the size of the ran-
dom fluctuations to MD and BD.8 Movements
of the federal funds rate outside the range r1-
rz are prevented by the monetary authorities
through injections or withdrawals using open
market·operations of whatever nonborrowed
reserves are required to keep the funds rate
within the specified range.
When a target is established for borrowed
reserves, the operating procedure works in fun-
damentally the same fashion, except in this case
the range offunds rate fluctuation is implicitly
determined by the random fluctuations in the
demand for borrowings rather than being ex-
plicitly stated in the operating procedure.
AssulIlethat the monetary authorities estab-
lish>and exactly achieve a target for borrowed
reserves 13 {Figure 2). With this fixed supply of
borrowed reserves to depository institutions,
the federal funds rate will be observed to fluc-
tl.lateillth¢ iailgerFr4 withthe "«,rtf"·,,!>,...
come dependent only upon the size of the ran-
dam fluctuation in the demand for borrowed
reserves.
The observed interest rate withinthe (r3-r4)
range is not affected by random fluctuations in
the demand formoney under this operating
procedure. The observed outcome in terms of
money stock, M, will be in the range MF M4
depending on the particular random fluctua-
tions to the demandfor borrowed reserves and
the demand for money. Under the assumption
ofexact control ofthe amount ofaggregate bor-
rowed reserves available to depository institu-
tions, the funds rate can fluctuate outside the
range r3-r4 only by a deviation of borrowed re-
serves from 13. If borrowed reserves were to
deviate from 13, the monetary authorities would
inject or withdraw nonborrowed reserves to
maintain borrowings at 13, and, implicitly, to
maintain the federal funds rate in the range rF
r4'
Inpractice the monetary authorities probably
cannot achieve the borrowed reserve target ex-
actly, but can keep the supply of borrowed re-
Figure 2






Bserves within a small range around B. The ad-
dition of such "noise" to the operating
procedure does not affect the conclusion drawn
from Figure 2 in any fundamental way. For
given random shocks to the demand for bor-
r()wedreserves(B?....B~), the implied range of
interest rate fluctuations (rrr4) will be larger
the larger the "noise" around the borrowed re-
serves target.9 Nevertheless, the establishment
of·a •borrowed reserves target implies the es-
tablishmentof a permissible range of fluctu-
ation forthe funds rate, and that range is main-
tained by the automatic provision or withdrawal
of nonborrowed reserves through open market
operations whenever market forces attempt to
drivethe rate outside the implicit range. lO
The ranges of federal funds rate fluctuation
in Figures 1 and 2 represent the degree offunds
rate volatility that will be observed under the
two operating procedures. The size of this
range is explicitly set as part of the federal
funds rate operating procedures.ll With a bor-
rowed reserves operating procedure, the size of
this range can be influenced, above some min-
imal amount determined by random shocks to
the demand for borrowed reserves, by the
amount of random fluctuation in borrowed re-
serves that is permitted around the target
value. 12 The implication of the volatility mea-
sures computed in Section II is that the volatil-
ity of the funds rate implicit in the borrowed
reserve operating procedure since the fall of
1982 has been basically the same as the volatil-
ity ofthe federal funds rate explicitly permitted
under the 1970s operating procedure.
What are the implications of this conclusion
for the short-run volatility of the monetary ag-
gregates? Figure 3 examines the implications
for the volatility of monetary aggregates of op-
erating procedures that establish ranges offluc-
tuation for the funds rate, whether explicit or
implicit (as with a borrowed reserves target).
First, consider the implication of widening
the permissible range of funds rate fluctuation
from r1-r2 to rrr4' as indicated in Figure 3.
With an unchanged range of fluctuation of the
short-run money demand function (M? to M~),




of Funds Rate Volatility to the
Monetary Aggregates
Federal Funds Rate
the monetary aggregates the wider the range of
funds rate fluctuation. In Figure 3, the wider
range of funds rate fluctuation (rrr4) implies
fluctuations of the money stock in the range M3
to M4compared with fluctuations in the range
M1 to M2 with the funds rate restricted to the
narrower range (r1-r2)' Thus, if the borrowed
reserves control procedure had introduced
more volatility into the funds rate, it could have
been expected to introduce more short-run vol-
atility into the monetary aggregates. 13
This comparison offunds rates and borrowed
reserves operating procedures stands in con-
trast to the results obtained from a comparison
of a funds rate and nonborrowed reserves op-
erating procedure. In the latter case, the mon-
etary authorities would allow more interest rate
volatility by not automatically conducting open
market operations to change the stock of non-
borrowed reserves. In the extreme, nonbor-
rowed reserves would be fixed regardless ofob-
served fluctuations in interest rates.
Generally, as operating procedures move to-
wards a smaller response of the supply of non-
borrowed reserves to interest rate fluctuations,
rate stability decreases (volatility increases)and the precision of short-run monetary control
increases. Thus, in moving from a federal funds
rate operating procedure toward a pure non-
borrowed reserves operating procedure, a
trade-off exists between interest rate volatility
and the precision·of shorHunmbnetary cone
trol. 14 This trade-off does not exist when com-
paring federal funds rate operating procedures
with borrowed reserves operating procedures
because both of those operating procedures al-
low the automatic changes in the supply ofnon-
borrowed reserves to depository institutions in
response to any shock that pushes the target
variable to an extreme of the predetermined
range of fluctuation.
Inertia in Adjusting Policy Guides
Although federal funds rate operating pro-
cedures as implemented in the 1970s and bor-
rowed reserves operating procedures as imple-
mented since fall 1982 may appear virtually the
same from the perspective of their effects on
short-run interest rate volatility and the short-
run precision of monetary control, it is possible
that the longer run precision of monetary con-
trol could improve from the switch. It could
improve if there were less inertia in adjusting
the operating guide under the borrowed re-
serves control procedure than under the federal
funds rate control procedure.
The presence of inertia in adjusting the op-
erating guides, whether interest rate or borrow-
ings, introduces positive serial correlation into
deviations of the money stock from its target
value. IS This positive serial correlation is
stronger the more infrequent the adjustment of
the target value for the operating guide and,
conversely, weaker the more frequent the ad-
justment of the target value for the operating
guide. Consequently, a change in operating
procedure that did not affect the precision of
short-run monetary control but that reduced
the serial correlation in the deviations of the
money stock from its target value would reduce
the longer run variation ofaverage money stock
measures around the longer run average target
value.
The inertia in adjusting the target value of
the operating guide is the source of the funda-
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mental criticism of the historical interest rate
and free reserves (borrowings) targeting re-
gimes: unless the monetary authorities are pre-
pared to adjust the target variables quickly and
correctly in response to new information, de-
viationsfrom the desired path ofthe monetary
aggregates are likely to persist.
The results discussed above suggest that a
simple indicator of the short-run precision of
monetary control with either an interest rate
operating guide ora·borrowed reserves oper-
ating guide is the short-run volatility ofinterest
rates. With the same money demand function
for the two control procedures, the larger the
variability of interest rates, the worse the pre-
cision of short-run monetary control. The data
on federal funds rate volatility during the pe-
riods 1969-79 and 1982-84 suggest that short-
run monetary control is unlikely to improve un-
der the procedures used by the FOMC since the
fall of 1982 compared to the experience of the
1970s. Ifthe proposition that the stability of the
short-run money demand function has deteri-
orated in the 1980s were correct, then a strong
case could be made that the operating proce-
dure in effect since fall 1982 will produce less
precise short-run monetary control than did the
procedures implemented in the 1970s.
Ifit is assumed that the random shocks to the
demand for borrowings are uncorrelated with
the random errors in interest rates under the
interest rate operating procedure, and that they
are also uncorrelated with the random errors in
the supply of borrowings under the borrowings
control procedure, then the volatility of ob-
served borrowings gives an equivalent measure
of the precision of monetary control. Under
these assumptions, and with a stable demand
function for borrowed reserves under the two
procedures, equal volatility of interest rates im-
plies equal volatility of borrowings.
This conclusion appears to be supported by
the data. The standard deviation of week to
week percentage changes in adjustment bor-
rowings (seasonal plus adjustment borrowings)
for those weeks when the federal funds rate ex-
ceeded the discount rate is .513 (.493) in 1969-
79 and .664 (.556) in October 1982-January
1984.At first glance, these estimates suggest that
the time series properties of the federal funds
+ .1008at-13
(.0419)





InFF! - InFF!- 1
+ .3941 (lnFFt ] - InFFt- 2)
(.1117)
= at + .7199at-12
(.1033)
s.e. = .0317 X 2(df=22) 18.42
X 2(.05)(df=22) = 33.92
February 1984-December 1984
InFFt - InFFt 1 = at + .4192at_2
. (.1416)
s.e. = .0348 X 2(df=23) = 21.88
X2(.05)(df=23) = 35.17
rate are strikingly different among the sample
periods discussed above, for which the variance
of weekly changes is similar. There is clearly a
distinct change associated with the introduction
of contemporaneous reserve requirements, but
the strong second order moving average term
in the post-January 1984 sample appears con-
sistent.with the change to a two-week reserve
averaging period.
The difference between the 1969-79 sample
and the 1982-84 sample, however, is not as
great as·it appears. The latter sample exhibits
more seasonality at approximately three-month
intervals as indicated by the large twelfth order
moving average factor. However, when the log
of the federal funds rate is written in moving
average form, the impact of innovations is re-
markably similar for at least the first six weeks.
The first terms of the moving average polyno-
mials for the two sample periods for the log of
the federal funds rate are:
January 1969-September 1979
InFFt = at + .854 (at-l + at 2 + at-3)
+ 1.081(at_4 + at 5 + at-6) +
and expressed in the same form:
October 1982-January 1984
InFFt = at
+ .69(.88at 1 + 1.11at-2 + 1.02at_3)
+ .72(1.01at-4 + .99at-5 + 1.00at-6)
+ ...
The only substantial difference between the
effects of the first six lagged innovations in the
two sample periods is that in the earlier sample
lags 1-3 have the same weight as lags 4-6. It
also appears that the three-week average of re-
cent innovations (lags 1-3) has slightly less
weight in the more recent period (.69 vs. 854),
but no measure of the significance of the dif-
ference is available. Even though the statistical
significance of these differences cannot be de-
termined, it seems appropriate to conclude that
there is no large difference in the intermediate-
run time series behavior of the federal funds
rate under the two control procedures. This evi-
dence is consistent with the hypothesis that the







It is possible, despite the experience with the
post-1982 borrowed reserves operating proce-
dure which suggests no improvement for short-
run monetary control over that experienced un-
der the federal funds rate control procedure of
th~1970s, that intermediate-run or.longer run
monetary control is improved by a reduction in
the inertia in adjusting the operating guide.
Changes in the precision of intermediate-run
monetary control (one- to six-months) should
be~videnced by distinctly different patterns iQ
the time series properties of interest rates. A
crude test of this hypothesis can be performed
by estimating ARIMA models for the federal
funds rate for the 1969-79 sample period and
for the sample since October 1982. The result-
ing models are:
January 1969-September 197916
InFFt- InFFt 1 =
at .1460at-l +
(.0409)
58dercurrent procedures, in terms of the speed
with which interest rates (and hence the money
stock) are allowed to adjust, is similar to the
inertia in the 1970s under the federal funds rate
operating guide.
IV. Conclusion
The available evidence suggests that interest
rate volatility increased across the maturity
spectrum with the introduction of the "newop-
erating procedure." Subsequently, in .1980~82
the volatility of rates declined. Itis not possible
to discriminate whether this represents learning
by market participants, contamination of the
1979~80 data by the credit control experience,
or a revision of the implementation of the non-
borrowed reserves operating procedure over
time. By 1981-82, the volatility of the federal
funds rate was not significantly greater than in
1969-79. Since the fall of 1982, volatility across
the maturity spectrum has been the same as
that experienced in the 1970s.
Since the volatility and time series ofthe fed-
eral funds rate under lagged reserve require-
ments and an operating procedure that targeted
borrowings between the fall of 1982 and Janu-
ary 1984 replicates very closely the behavior of
this rate under the fed funds rate operating pro-
cedure in effect prior to October 1979, it ap-
pears that the two operating procedures have
similar implications for the short-run control of
the growth of monetary aggregates.
Both operate through the money demand
function and both share the common property
that inertia in adjusting the target to new in-
formation will produce persistent drift
monetary aggregate fromits target value. How-
ever, if the stability of econometric money de-
mand functiOns has deteriorated in the 1980s
compared tothe 1970s, as is frequently alleged,
then a borrowings operating procedure that
produces essentially the same funds rate vola-
tility as the funds rate operating procedure, will
not improve the precision ofshort-runmone-
tary control.
The outlook for longer run monetary control
under the two operating procedures is primarily
determined by the degree ofinertia in adjusting
the operating targets. If it is more feasible for
the FOMC to adjust a borrowed reserveS target
correctly in response to new information than
it would be to adjust a federal funds rate target,
then a borrowed reserves operating procedure
could improve longer run monetary control
even though short"run control could be less pre-
cise than under the funds rate operating pro-
cedure. Since the FOMC continues publicly to
maintain the objective of gradually reducing
the rate ofmonetary growth to non-inflationary
levels, final judgment on the effectiveness of
the current operating procedure must be de-
ferred until the success or failure of current
monetary policy is established.
InTR = InRR + In(1 + ~~)
= InRR + f.Ls
VI 1m + V2 InRD + V3 InBOR
VI (lnr + (1) + V2 (InRD + (2)
+ V3 (InBOR + (3)
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(3) InBOR = <Xo + <Xl (lor - lord) + f.L3
(4) InTR = wllnRD
+ (l - WI) InBOR + f.L4
Some framework broad enough to evaluate
the effects of the three alternative operating
procedures on monetary aggregates and inter-
est rates yet simple enough to produce useful
conclusions is necessary. The vehicle used here
is an extension of the money market model of
equations 1 through 3 in the text.
The model is presented below.
(1) InM = 'Yo + 'YI InY + 'Y21m + f.LI
(2) InM = p + 8] InRR + f.L2
59'Yo - f.Li
"10 + f.Li + "1;£1 +
'YlOE1-l InYt + "IilnYt
+ "Izolnrt + "I;lnrt
_ 1
Inrt = - (lnM* -
"Izo
- 'YIO El-I InYt
monetary aggregate at t.
From (8):
(10) El-I InMt =
(11)
so
nonborrowed reserves (RU) or borrowings
(BQR) to be set as an exogenous variable by
suitable choice of the parameters, Vi'
Not7that the control regimes are mutually
exclusIve: a nonzero value for one of the v· re-
• 1
qUlf<;S>that the other two Vj be set .at zero.
The model has been specified to capture the
relevant properties of empirical money market
models, yet to retain log-linearity so that ex-
plicit reducedform expressions can be derived
for In r, In M, In RU and In BOR. The general
reduced form eqnations (without regard to the
control regime) are functions of the potential
exogeE-0us variables: income ("I), the discount
rate (r), nonborrowed reserves (RU) and bor-
rowings (BOR). The stochastic terms in these
reduced form equations are functions of the
st~chastic f.LS and £s in equations 1 through 6.
Fmally, the coefficients in the reduced forms
are complicated functions of the structural pa-
rameters of the model and the control regime
variables-vb V2, and V3'
. T~e model is not complete without a speci-
fIcatIOn of the "policy rule" that governs how
the operating procedure is adjusted over time. IS
Two extreme cases are interesting. The first is
complete adjustment each period to any new
information in the attempt to keep the mone-
tary aggregate on its target path. The second
regime is one of inertia in which the control
variable is adjusted infrequently.
(7)
(8)
Inrt = Inft + £t
InMt = "10 + f.LI + 'YZ£I
+ "IllnYt + "I21nft
and !he policy rule governing the adjustment
of Inrt is:
(9) El-I InMt = InM*
or Vz = 1.0; VI = V3 = 0.0
or V3 = 1.0; VI = Vz = 0.0
Note: Greek letters can be polynomials in the
lag operator B; i.e.
"11 = "II (B) = "110 + "111 B + "112 BZ
d * - z an , "11 - "I11B + "IIzB + --- for any
polynomial
Equation 1 is the money demand equation
used above. Equation 2 is a reserve require"
ment that allows for stochastic fluctuations in
reserve requirements (p + f.LI) as a result of
shifts in reserves among different types of
banks and the possibility of lagged reserve ac-
counting by changing the parameters of the
polynomial ~.17
Equation 3 is a borrowings function that re-
lates borrowings by financial institutions to the
spread (in percentage terms) between market
rates and the discount rate. Equation 4 is a Tay-
lorseries expansion of the log of total reserves
in terms of the log of nonborrowed reserves
a.nd the log of borrowings with an approxima-
tion error (f.L4) to represent the higher order
terms of the expansion. Equation 5 is a state-
ment of the identity between total ~eserves, re"
quired reserves and excessive reserves, with an
assumption that the excess reserve ratio can be
approximated by a stochastic process (f.Ls). Fi-
nally, equation 6 allows the interest rate (r),
A. Continual Adjustment of Control Variable:
Interest Rate Operating Guides
In this situation, the reduced form equations
for interest rates and the monetary aggregate
are:
where El-I InMt is the monetary authorities'
forecast of InMt based on information available
at t - 1 and InM; is the desired value of the
and
(12) (lnMt - InM*)
= f.Llt + 'Y20£lt + 'YlO(lnYt - El IlnYt)
60This is the standard result (Thomson and
Pierce, 1972) that under an interest rate control
procedure with constant adjustment, deviations
from monetary targets depend upon stochastic
money demand fluctuations and errors in fore-
casting income. The additional term here is
generated by the error in hitting the interest
rate target, CIt. As long as the income forecast
errors are not serially correlated, deviations of
money growth from targets should not exhibit
serial correlation.
B. Continual Adjustment of Control Variable:
Borrowing Operating Guide
In this situation, the reduced form equations
for borrowings and the monetary aggregate are:
(13) InBORt = C3t + In BORt
(14) InMt = [(1'0 + fLIt) + (:~) C3t
(ao + fL3t) (:~)] + 1'1 InYt
+ 1m? + (~~) InBORt
and the policy rule covering the adjustment of
InBORt is the same as in equation9: We assume
that the discount rate is set exactly by the mon-
etary authority and is not changed.19
The resufting behavior of the monetary ag-
gregate relative to the target value is described
by:
(15) (lnMt InM*) = fLIt
+ I'IO(lnYt - Ei I InYt)
C. Infrequent Adjustment of the Control Variable To New
Information: Interest Rate Operating Guide
+ 2: I'IT-i (lnYT- Ei-n InYT )
i=t n
In a regime where InBORt is set at a value
based on information available at t nand
maintained at that value for n subsequent pe-
riods, that is, set InBORTso that Ei-n InMT =




The criticism levied against monetary control
procedure in the 1970s and the free reserves
procedures of the 1950s and 1960s was not di-
rected against the regimes described above.
Rather, as is now generally acknowledged, in
those periods, targets were changed only infre-
quently, or only by small amounts, in spite of
the availability of new information.
Consider a regime where forT is set at a value
based on information available at time t - nand
maintained at that value for r subsequent pe-
riods, that is, set lorTso thatEi-n InMT= InM*
for T = t- n+ 1,.., 1.
then
(16) (lnMT - InM*)
(fLIT - Ei-n fLIT)
+ I'I(lnYT Ei-n InYT )
+ I'z[lmT+ CIT - Ei n(lnrT+ CIT)]
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T
fLIT + 2: I'IT i (lnYT
i=t~n
T
+ 2: I'ZT-i cIT
i=t-n
for T = t - n+1,...,t
TApPENDIX B

















Jan 69-Sept 79 Oct 79 Oct 80 Oct 81 Oct 82 Feb 84
Sept 80 Sept 81 Sept 82 Jan 84 Dec 84
--------
.28 .95 .87 .63 .43 .39
.21 .64 .69 .56 .18 .17
.18 .57 .57 .48 .21 .16
.17 .51 .43 .43 .20 .16
.14 .49 .39 .40 .22 .18
.12 .43 .44 .36 .21 .18
.09 .33 .31 .35 .20 .18
.08 .29 .29 .33 .19 .17
.- _.....~,_.... -~"'~- -- .~,_..,~__._..~~,_ ..~_,-~"""".,,.~,,"--'" """" -----------------------
FOOTNOTES
1. The results reported in Johnson, et al. Tables 4-9 were
reproduced with the data set employed in this study. The
current data set replicates the previously reported results
with a high degree of accuracy.
2. This point also appears in the bond duration literature
where the percentage change in bond prices for a given
absolute change in yield to maturity is shown to be pro-
portional to the duration of the bond. Since. for a given
maturity and coupon rate, duration decreases with in-
creases in yield to maturity, the percentage (and absolute)
change in bond price for a given change in yield to maturity
is lower the higher the initial yield (see Yawitz, 1977).
3. The discussion here focuses on week-to-week per-
centage changes in the various rates (measured as log first
differences). Measures of interest rate volatility were also
constructed using percentage deviations from various
length centered moving geometric averages. These mea-
sures were compared with the measure reported in John-
son, et al. for deviations from centered moving arithmetic
averages. The results of these comparisons are consistent
with the comparisons reported here between arithmetic
and percentage changes in rates.
In particular, the same pattern of significant increases in
interest rate volatility in the 1979-80 period, and declining
volatility in subsequent sample periods, is observed when
the computations are performed relative to centered geo-
metric moving averages.
4. Volatility measures were also tabulated for the 1969-
70 and 1973-75 subsamples considered by Johnson, et
al. Measurements of rate volatility in percentage changes
for these subsamples share the homoskedasticity property
that Johnson, et a/. found in the arithmetic measures of
volatility.
5. The figures presented here are graphical representa-
tions of the short-run money demand and money supply
model in Appendix A.
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6. The random variation in the money demand function is
represented by J..L1 in the model in Appendix A; the random
fluctuation in the demand for borrowed reserves by J..L3'
7. In Appendix A, the fluctuation of the federal funds rate
under a funds rate operating procedure is represented by
£1'
8. In Figures 1A and 1B we assume that the fluctuations
of the federal funds rate in the range r1-r2are independent
of shocks to the money demand function. In practice, dur-
ing the 1970s, the Fed's Trading Desk was given the au-
thority to move the federal funds rate systematically toward
an extreme of the range established by the FOMe when
the growth of money stock was observed to deviate from
the established short-run path. This procedure implies a
nonzero covariance between money demand shocks and
deviations of the funds rate from the midpoint of the r1-r2
range. The general expression for the variability of the
money stock under this control procedure is given by equa-
tion 12 in Appendix A, which can accommodate nonzero
covariance between £1' the funds rate fluctuation, and J..L1-
the shock to money demand.
9. In terms of the model in Appendix A, the variability of
the funds rate is determined by the expression:
alO
which represented the effect of random disturbances to the
demand for borrowed reserves (J..L3t) and the range of fluc-
tuation in the supply of borrowed reserves (£3t). The inter-
est rate fluctuations are amplified or attentuated by the
interest elasticity of the demand for borrowed reserves, but
are not affected by the parameters of or residual variance
in the demand for money.
10. Recent directives give the Desk authority to change
the degree of restraint on reserve positions systematically
when the growth of the money stock is observed to deviatefrom the paths established by the FOMC. This procedure
implies a nonzero covariance between fluctuations in bor-
rowed reserves supplied and shocks to money demand. In
the discussion here, a zero covariance is assumed. The
general expression that allows for nonzero covariances is
given in equation 15 of Appendix A.
11. tit in the model of Appendix A.
f.L3t t3t. .
12. -~~-~~ In the model of Appendix A.
«10
13. This can be seen by comparing either equations 12
and 15 or 16 and 17 in Appendix A. The only difference
between 12 and 15 or 16 and 17 is the replacement of tit
in 12 and 15 by
«10
in 15 and 16. But those terms just represent the volatility
of interest rates under the two operating procedures.
Hence, if a funds rate operating procedure is compared
with a borrowed reserves operating procedure under the
assumption that the variance of the random component of
money demand and the precision of forecasting income
are unchanged, then the operating procedure with the
larger volatility of interest rates will exhibit less precision in
short-run monetary control.
14. Graphically, the movement from a federal funds op-
erating procedure to a pure nonborrowed reserves oper-
ating procedure is a change from a horizontal "money sup-
ply function" to a vertical'"money supply function."
Intermediate cases, where the operating procedure allows
for some response in the supply of nonborrowed reserves
to interest rate fluctuations, are represented by positively
sloped "money supply functions."
15. This serial correlation is introduced through the distrib-
uted lag terms in the estimated short-run money demand
equation, and occurs even if the underlying random dis-
turbances in the model (f.L1I, f.L2t, tll and <3t) are not serially
correlated.
16. at represents a shock to the federal funds rate. The x2
statistic measures the probability that the a's are not seri-
ally correlated. A tabulated x2value below the critical value
signifies that the probability of serial correlation in the a's
is below conventionally accepted levels of statistical
significance.
17; By suitable choice of the coefficients in the poiynom-
inal 0, the model can even handle different marginal and
average reserve requirements such as proposed by Poole
(1976). A potential criticism of this model is that it does not
adequately account for the expectational behavior of either
households and firms with respect to the demand for
money or banks with respect to theirdemand for borrowed
reserves from the Federal Reserve System.
An elegant analysis of short-run money market behavior
has been constructed recently by Goodfried, et al. (1983).
It attempts to incorporate rational expectations with respect
to future interest rate behavior on the part of money de-
manders and banks, a sophisticated supply function for
borrowed reserves that captures "administrative pressure"
at the discount Window, and a gradual adjustment rule for
the supply of nonborrowed reserves. The dynamic prop-
erties of this model closely replicate the dynamic properties
of a simple model such as that in Table 10. Therefore,
conclusions drawn from a model such as that in Table 10
should be applicable over a broad range of potential
models.
18. We assume that the monetary authorities have no time
advantage with respect to curreJ:lLdevelopments, so the
setting of the policy variable (r, RU or BOR) for time = t
is based solely on information available through time =
t - 1.
19. In fact, the discount rate at the NY Federal Reserve
Bank changed on only three occasions in the period Oc-
tober 1982 through January 1984, and only twice during
1984, so discount rate changes are not a major consider-
ation in current operating procedures.
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